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CAV (connected and autonomous vehicle) is a crucial part of intelligent transportation systems. CAVs utilize both sensors and
communication components to make driving decisions. A large number of companies, research organizations, and governments
have researched extensively on the development of CAVs. (e increasing number of autonomous and connected functions
however means that CAVs are exposed to more cyber security vulnerabilities. Unlike computer cyber security attacks, cyber
attacks to CAVs could lead to not only information leakage but also physical damage. According to the UK CAV Cyber Security
Principles, preventing CAVs from cyber security attacks need to be considered at the beginning of CAV development. In this
paper, a large set of potential cyber attacks are collected and investigated from the aspects of target assets, risks, and consequences.
Severity of each type of attacks is then analysed based on clearly defined new set of criteria.(e levels of severity for the attacks can
be categorized as critical, important, moderate, and minor. Mitigation methods including prevention, reduction, transference,
acceptance, and contingency are then suggested. It is found that remote control, fake vision on cameras, hidden objects to LiDAR
and Radar, spoofing attack to GNSS, and fake identity in cloud authority are the most dangerous and of the highest vulnerabilities
in CAV cyber security.
1. Introduction
Connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV), as a subset of
the Intelligent Transportation System, makes use of different
hardware, e.g., electronic control units (ECUs) and sensors,
software, e.g., entertainment system and decision-making
units, and data fused from multiple sources to conduct
driving tasks with different levels of automation. With these
components, CAVs could not only drive without human
involvement but also communicate with surroundings to
navigate and take appropriate reactions. (e automation of
CAVs is supported by the sensors installed around the
vehicle body which gather information of surrounding
environments to make decisions. (e connectivity is
achieved by the communication with other vehicles, infra-
structures, and pedestrians on the road to navigate and take
relevant reactions.
Currently, a large number of companies investigate and
focus on the research and development of CAVs. In China,
one of the biggest IT companies Baidu released an open
source autonomous driving platform named Apollo, aiming
to address the challenging issues of precise sensing and
decision-making [1]. In USA, Tesla released their Autopilot
for assistant driving and Summon system for assistant
parking in 2015 and 2016, respectively [2].(e latest news on
Tesla official website [3] introduces the enhanced Autopilot
system, which supports autonomous driving in certain
scenarios such as highways. Google is also a leading player in
connected and autonomous driving. Its subcompany
Waymo, set up in 2009, has been focusing on the research
and development of CAVs and finished more than 2 million
miles road test [4]. Taxi-hailing company Uber also tests
their own CAVs on public roads in Arizona [5]. In Europe,
traditional vehicle manufactures including Audi and
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Mercedes Benz also announce their initiatives on CAVs.
Audi already conducted 550 km on-road test, based on their
own autonomous vehicle “Jack” [6]. Mercedes Benz started
to develop CAVs in 1980s; now, their latest S-class Benz
vehicles completed 100 km road trials in Germany [7].
To accelerate the CAV development, governments also
publish relevant regulations and principles. In USA,
regulations and laws on CAV are built at the state level [8].
Chinese government also released a ten-year plan “Made
in China 2025” plan, which aims to master the key CAV
technologies by 2025 [9]. In addition, Chinese government
launched an abundance of CAV demonstration projects
and set up Jiading district in Shanghai as the first public
test field for CAVs [10]. Moreover, CAV competitions
among academic organizations have been held successfully
several times around the world. (ese include the US
DARPA Urban Challenge in 2007 and DARPA Grand
challenge in 2004 [11]. In China, the Future Challenges of
Intelligent Vehicles competition has been held since 2008,
sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China [12]. With the participation of an increasing
number of research organizations, these competitions not
only provide platforms for researchers to communicate
but also raise public interests on CAV developments.
According to a survey conducted by Boston Consulting
Group, 55% of public would like to try an autonomous
vehicle or even buy one [13].
However, all the CAV research works mentioned above
focus on the functions of either automation or connectivity.
(e cyber security of CAVs is not being sufficiently
addressed. As a fundamental part of the CAV development,
cyber security plays a crucial role on the function safety of
CAVs, which will influence public trust and CAV com-
mercialization directly. According to the newly released UK
CAV Cyber Security Principles [14], CAV cyber security
should be considered at the early stage of CAV development
from the design phase, based on which the whole supply
chain could then prevent CAVs from cyber security risks
and issues in the following phases.
Comparing to traditional networks, mobile network or
traditional automobile network, CAV cyber security has
specific characteristics including large amount of data,
complex functions, and fatal consequences, as shown in
Table 1. (ese differences indicate that the cyber security of
CAVs should be considered specifically and in different ways
compared to the cyber security strategies in traditional
networks or automobile networks.
(e main aim of this paper is to investigate different
potential cyber attack points of CAV. (e specific charac-
teristics of CAV are analysed and potential attack points of
CAV are listed. (e authors also present new criteria to
evaluate the potential attacks to CAVs. (e severity of each
attack is then analysed and mitigation methods are then
suggested.
(e main contributions of this paper are listed as below:
(1) Definitions and categorization of all the potential
attacks for CAVs: the attack categories cover both the
autonomous elements such as the in-vehicle system
and sensors on the vehicles, and the connected parts
or functions such as V2X communication in CAVs.
(e paper also identifies the gaps and the limitations
of current studies. For example, there is a lack of
research and developments on cyber security for the
connectivity elements of CAVs. In addition, those
papers in the literature discussing the attacks to
CAVs focus on only some specific attack types. (e
missing types of attacks require further research. By
defining the initial set of all potential attacks to CAVs
within a structured category and of different se-
verities, additional unexpected new attacks to CAVs
could be added in the future research. (at is, the
categories of the potential attacks and criteria apply
to new attacks; thus, the set of attacks is extendable to
include new attacks.
(2) A new severity assessment on potential attacks to
CAVs: the assessment criteria used in engineering
and information technology are adopted to define
the criteria suitable for assessing CAVs attacks. (is
is a new adoption of such criteria assessing the se-
verity of different CAV attacks.
(3) A new categorization of mitigation methods to CAV
attacks: the recovery and protection mechanisms are
key issues in cyber security of CAVs. Defining
mitigation methods presents guidance to future
research, including intrusion detection or encryption
to protect the overall CAV systems. (e mitigation
category method categorizes the mitigation methods
into prevention, production, acceptance, transfer-
ence, and contingency. With the establishment of
test environments, this categorization could be
adopted to respond to different attacks.
(e paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the related works on cyber security in CAVs and also the
related subject of Vehicular Ad hoc Network. Section 3 then
describes the methodology to define different criteria to
assess the risk of different attacks. In Section 4, the potential
cyber attacks are listed to analyse each of their severity with
the criteria listed in Section 3. Mitigation methods of cyber
security attacks on CAVs are then recommended in Section
5. Section 6 summarizes the paper and discusses the future
challenges faced by CAV cyber security research.
2. Related Work
(e SAE International defined “driving automation” as that
the system could conduct part of or all DDT (Dynamic
Driving Tasks) continuously [20]. DDTare defined as three
different levels by the SAE J3061 standard, namely, oper-
ational functions, tactical functions, and strategic func-
tions. (e relations of these three functions are illustrated
in Figure 1. Operational functions include basic motion
control such as lateral and longitudinal motion controls.
Tactical functions include all the operational functions plus
OEDR (Object and Event Detection and Response). In the
current DDT performance, the strategic functions such as
destination and waypoint planning are not included.
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(e response by either users or the system to perform
DDT when a system failure happens is defined as DDT
fallback by SAE International. ODD (Operational Design
Domain) is considered as the driving system which requires
a specific running environment including environmental,
geographical, or time restrictions. For example, some au-
tonomous driving vehicles only operate in a closed envi-
ronment [21], which indicates that the vehicle is still
designed under a limited ODD. Based on the DDT per-
formance, DDT fallback, and ODD, SAE International then
defines the vehicle automation into 6 different levels, as
shown in Table 2.
Besides the automation taxonomy, there are attempts to
discuss CAV cyber security. In [22], the authors discussed
the possible cyber security attacks on autonomous vehicles.
After listing all the possible attacks, the authors then pro-
vided mitigation solutions to each attack. It is recommended
that it is important to keep sufficient redundancy in au-
tonomous vehicles. Sufficient sensor data could help vehicles
to know the surroundings and positions. Among all these
attacks, they believed that GNSS spoofing and fake message
injection are the most threatening risks, both of which will
threaten passengers’ lives. It is believed that antispoofing
hardware and authentication methods are needed in au-
tonomous vehicles.
In [23], the authors discussed cyber security in con-
nected vehicles and believed that the vehicles would be more
vulnerable with the increasing connectivity. (is paper
described the possible attack scenarios including USB
update attacks, communication attacks, and malicious ap-
plication installation. A system using machine learning
methods is then built to detect the anomaly behaviours in
CAN-Bus (Controller Area Network) and the operating
system.
In [24], the authors attempted to use the categories of
cyber security in computer science to describe the possible
attacks in CAVs. (e possible attacks are divided into
passive attacks and active attacks. (e passive attacks are
easy to prevent but difficult to detect, while the active attacks
are easy to detect but difficult to prevent. Feasible mitigation
methods including authentication and encryption were
recommended.
In [25], the authors assumed that connected vehicles are
similar to all the Internet devices and cyber security should
be considered as a fundamental part of their development.
(e authors then discussed the potential cyber attacks on
V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) Communication and pro-
posed a novel cyber security architecture called CVGuard to
detect the attacks in V2I. (e CVGuard reduced 60% DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Service) attacks which might cause
vehicle conflicts.
In [19], it is pointed out that modern cars are already new
targets for hackers. Engines, doors, and brakes could all be
possible vulnerable points. In addition, nowadays, the at-
tackers do not need to approach the target vehicle physically.
All the vehicles in the communication range could be
hacked. (e authors also listed OBD (On-Board Diagnos-
tics) threat, DSRC communication, Malware, and
Table 1: Comparison of CAVs/traditional vehicles/mobile networks.
Compared to traditional vehicles Compared to computer network/mobile network
1. (ere are more ECUs and more codes in CAVs [15], which means
more data to be processed
1. In addition to information leakage, cyberattacks to CAVs could
cause physical damage or even fatal injuries
2. (ere are multiple communication protocols in CAVs, such as
CAN [16], 5G, and DSRC [17]; different communication protocols
lead to multiple data formats, which require more preprocessing time
2. CAVs require higher detection accuracy as well as shorter data
processing time; in the EuropeMetis project, the latency is expected
to be less than 5ms and the accuracy is expected to be 99.999%
when transmitting a 1600 bytes data package [18]
3. (ere are more connected functions, meaning the number of
potential attack points is also increasing [19]
3. (e application scenarios are more complicated; CAVs are more
likely to drive in unregulated areas such as parking lots, highways,
and rural areas
Destination and
waypoint planning OEDR
Lateral vehicle
motion control
Vehicle
motion
Longitudinal vehicle
motion control
Basic vehicle motion control
Operational functions
Planning and execution for event/object
avoidance and expedited route followingTactical functions
Strategic functions
Route and destination timing and selection
Figure 1: Schematic view of driving tasks [20].
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automobile apps as the most vulnerable parts on vehicles.
(e authors then offered the solutions to address the cyber
security issues including OTA solution, cloud based solu-
tion, and layer-based solution.
(ere are also research attempts in simulation envi-
ronments to examine the influence of cyber attacks to CAVs.
In [26], simulated slight attacks were made to study lon-
gitudinal safety of CAVs, i.e., on the positions and speed via
GPS communications. An empirical model named PATH
CAV from a field test [27, 28] and a RCRI (Rear-end
Collision Risk Index) based on stopping distance was used to
evaluate the safety. (e authors found that the slight attacks
to the CAV positions are severer than they are to the speed.
(e slight cyber attacks will also make severer impacts on
decelerating than accelerating. In addition, the slight attacks
to multiple CAVs are more dangerous than attacks of higher
severity to fewer number of vehicles. (is research will help
to find a more efficient mitigation method to the attacks to
V2V communications.
In [29], four possible attack points of the vehicle have
been discussed, including signal controllers, vehicle detec-
tors, roadside units, and onboard units. (e focus was on the
attacks to infrastructures. (e authors attacked the traffic
signal control systems by sending spoofed data, which
showed to increase the delay. Some attacks in the experi-
ments also showed to cause severe congestion. Based on the
attacks, an approach was devised to identify this kind of
attacks by analysing the attack locations, which helps to
design a more stable transportation network.
As a fast emerging research topic, CAV cyber security
has just started attracting increasing research attention. In
addition to the limited research on cyber security in CAVs,
research on VANET (Vehicular Ad hoc Networks) may
contribute to the research on the connected functions of
CAVs. VANET uses V2V communication and V2I com-
munication to help vehicles gathering traffic information
[30], while CAVs extend the boundaries to the wider V2X
(Vehicle-to-Everything) communications.
VANETis amobile ad hoc network, where the vehicles are
the mobile nodes [31]. In [31], the authors listed the possible
privacy and security challenges to the safety of VANET in-
cluding the attacks on confidentiality, integrity, or data trust.
(ey claimed that encryption is important to VANET.
In [32], the authors concluded that VANET has three
specific characteristics, which are frequent vehicle move-
ment, time critical response, and hybrid architecture. Other
attacks listed include bogus information, DoS attacks,
Masquerade, and GPS spoofing. (e authors also propose
several mitigation methods including public key, certificate
revocation approaches, and ID-based cryptography.
Research in [33] focused on threats and attacks to ve-
hicular communication. (e authors built a three-layer
framework and pointed out the potential threats and attacks
to V2X communication such as remote communication
protocols including DSRC or Bluetooth. It also suggested
machine learning and block chain as countermeasures to
detect attacks.
In the literature listed above, the majority of the re-
searchers believe that cyber security is a fundamental part in
CAV developments, which demands urgently more research
and investigations. (e majority of researchers agreed that
the increasing connected and autonomous functions will
increase the possibilities of cyber attacks. However, existing
research mainly focused on the cyber security of autono-
mous functions. (e potential attacks should be considered
from both the autonomous and connected aspects. (ere are
attempts to discuss the most severe attacks, but there is a lack
of systematic evaluation criteria in the literature. Some re-
search discussed the mitigation methods including en-
cryption or authentication, but there are still the needs of
further investigations to identify comprehensive and sys-
tematic mitigation methods to categorized cyber attacks.
Overall, the literature on CAV cyber security is limited and
requires more investigation and research efforts. Awareness
of cyber security in CAV should be raised as well.
(is paper significantly extends the existing research by
defining potential attacks to both connectivity and auton-
omy, as well as both in-vehicle and intervehicle potential
cyber attacks. Moreover, severity evaluation criteria for
cyber attacks are defined and the severity level of each attack
is also evaluated based on the criteria defined in this paper.
Corresponding mitigation methods are then suggested at the
end. (is research aims to raise cyber security awareness of
consumers, OEMs, researchers, and manufactures and also
present a starting point to develop the detection and pre-
vention methods towards CAV cyber attacks.
3. Potential CAV Cyber Attack Criteria
(e potential attack points or attack ports are analysed
firstly. For each potential attack, the following criteria will
then be adopted to assess its severity.
Table 2: SAE automation levels [20].
Level Name
DDT
DDT fallback ODD
Sustained motion control OEDR
0 No driving automation Driver Driver Driver N/A
1 Driver assistance Driver and system Driver Driver Limited
2 Partial driving automation System Driver Driver Limited
3 Conditional driving automation System System Fallback-ready user(becomes the driver during fallback) Limited
4 High driving automation System System System Limited
5 Full driving automation System System System Unlimited
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(enewCAV assessment criteria are defined based on the
widely used formula in engineering risk assessment in dif-
ferent areas including transportation and infrastructure [34],
information technology system [35], and civil aviation [36]:
Risk � Asset∗Vulnerability ∗Threat. (1)
(e new assessment criteria evaluate three aspects of cyber
attacks, namely, the asset of the possible attack targets, vul-
nerability of the possible risks to the attack targets, and threat of
the possible consequences. As mentioned in Section 1, due to
several key differences between traditional automobile network
cyber security and CAV cyber security, some extra criteria are
adapted to our new CAV cyber security assessment. For ex-
ample, to evaluate the severity of the risk, the assessment
criteria of CAVs should consider not only the level of infor-
mation leakage but also the level of physical damage.
3.1. Asset of the Attacked Targets
(1) Asset name: in computer security, ISO/IEC 13335-1:
2004 defines that assets include all the hardware or
software components on computers which are exposed
to an attack target, e.g., a dataset and one piece of
hardware or software code [37]. CAVs are equipped
with a large number ECUs and sensors and are thus
vulnerable to an abundance of possible attacks. More
detailed assets will be explained in Section 4.
(2) Asset importance: the importance of each asset is
categorized into three levels:
(a) Low: the breakdown of this asset will not affect
the operational and tactical functions of the
whole CAV system. In the SAE J3016 standard
[20], operational functions include lateral and
longitudinal vehicle motion control, including
the most basic functions of starting, stopping,
driving, and controlling [38]. (e tactical
functions include the OEDR as introduced in
Section 2.
(b) Medium: the breakdown of this asset might
influence tactical functions of the vehicle,
however would not have direct impacts on the
operational functions. In addition, the asset
function could be replaced or covered by other
assets on the vehicle. For example, if cameras on
CAV breakdown, the vehicle could still use other
sensors to detect the surroundings.
(c) High: the breakdown of this asset may cause
damage to operational functions of the vehicle
directly. For example, the in-vehicle system,
which sends instructions to ECUs to maintain
the vehicle speed or stop the vehicle in certain
situations, is of high importance.
3.2. Vulnerability of the Attacked Targets
(1) Risk name: each asset may be exposed to more than
one risk. (is criterion assesses specific risks to each
asset; more details are presented in Section 4.
(2) Difficulty of conduction: the difficulty of conducting
an attack varies depends on its characteristics. Some
attacks may require sufficient expertise from the
attackers in specific areas such as GPS spoofing or
fake identification. Some devices, such as GNSS
satellites, are securely protected by the governments.
Hacking into these devices needs not only knowledge
but also sufficient time and money. (e difficulty of
conduction is considered based on the knowledge,
time, and budget needed and can be graded into
three levels listed as below:
(a) Low: attackers do not need to acquire relevant
knowledge to conduct the attack or the target
asset is easy to be obtained/bought on the
market. (e attack is not time consuming.
(b) Medium: attackers only need to spend a short
time (weeks/months) to learn the required
knowledge. Hacking into the target asset needs to
be purchased at a high price, or the hacking
process is time consuming.
(c) High: attackers need to have extensive knowledge
on the target asset or need to spend years to learn
relevant knowledge. (e target asset is difficult to
find in the market or costs an astronomical figure.
(3) Detection possibilities: this criterion defines the level
of possibilities detecting attacks by the users or the
CAV system. In computer science, the attacks are
divided into two main categories, namely, passive
attacks and active attacks [39]. Passive attacks do not
interrupt the system but will monitor or eavesdrop it
to access information. Active attacks will interrupt
the system functions directly by methods such as
injecting fake message. In general, passive attacks are
difficult to detect but easy to defend, while active
attacks are difficult to defend but easy to detect [24].
Although passive attacks may not cause harms on
system functions, the information loss could also be a
severe risk because CAVs will be the ultimate per-
sonal mobile device in the future [40], storing sen-
sitive data including personal home address, contact
numbers, and financial information. It is essential to
evaluate the detection possibilities of different at-
tacks. (e levels of detection possibilities are cate-
gorized into three levels as listed below.
(a) Low: the attacks will not affect any function
(whether operational or tactical functions) of the
CAV system. It is difficult to detect the attack in
normal use. (e best solution is to prevent the
attacks from happening in advance with en-
cryption or authentication.
(b) Medium: the attacks will not affect the opera-
tional functions of the CAV system so the users
would not notice the attacks immediately.
However, the attacks would affect some parts of
the tactical or strategic functions.(e system will
detect the abnormal behaviour afterwards and
warn users.
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(c) High: the attacks will influence the operational
function immediately so the users could notice
them immediately. For example, if the vehicle
suddenly stopped on the road, the users would
notice the abnormal situation immediately. In
addition, if the cameras around the vehicle
breakdown, the system will notice this abnormal
situation promptly.
3.3. Consequences of the Attacks
(1) Consequence name: to each possible risk, there may
be more than one consequence. (e consequences
will be listed and then be analysed; more details are
presented in Section 4.
(2) Severity of information leakage: information leakage
has been a major cyber security issue in computer
science. Information leakage attacks usually damage
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
system [37]. (e severity is based on the scale and
importance of the leaked information.
(a) Low: the attack will not leak any private
information.
(b) Medium: the attack will leak nonconfidential
personal information or unimportant informa-
tion at a small scale. For example, the attacker
may know the preference of the passenger on
choosing routes or on the entertainment system.
(is type of information leakage will not cause
further harm directly.
(c) High: the attack will leak highly important
confidential information such as the financial
information, the home address, or the personal
ID. With this information, the attackers could
conduct further harmful actions to the victims.
In other situations, this information leakage
would cause larger scale information leakage
such as personal data stored in the cloud.
(3) Severity of physical damage: compared with traditional
networks, cyber attacks to CAVs could lead to physical
damage or even fatalities directly. Tesla vehicle has
already caused fatalities on a straight road with good
visibility and in a good weather [41]. On March 2018,
an Uber autonomous vehicle struck and killed a pe-
destrian crossing the road in Arizona, USA [42]. (e
Uber test vehicle failed to detect the pedestrian in the
environment of low visibility and failed to conduct any
corresponding actions. As a large machine, CAV could
cause hazards or even be exploited as a weapon. With
the possible consequences, the severity of physical
damage can be categorized as below.
(a) Low: the attacks are not likely to cause physical
damage to human or other vehicles, and
infrastructures
(b) Medium: the attacks are likely to cause small
hazards and damage to infrastructures or vehi-
cles, but would not cause fatal injuries to people
(c) High: the attacks have a high possibility to cause
fatal injuries
(4) Combined severity level: a method evaluating the
combined severity is adapted from risk management
in the information system [35]. In the information
system, the risks are determined by the likelihood
and impact. To determine the combined severity
levels to CAVs, a new severity matrix is built based
on the severity of information leakage and physical
damage, as shown in Table 3. If the severity of in-
formation leakage and physical damage are at the
same level, then the combined severity will be at the
same level as well. However, considering its im-
portance, if the severity of physical damage is high,
the combined severity level will be high as well.
(5) Recovery time: this criterion evaluates the time
needed to recover to normal situation after the attack
has been detected.
(a) Low: after the detection, the damage caused by
the attack can be fixed in a timescale of seconds
(b) Medium: after the detection, the damage caused
by the attack can be fixed in a timescale of
minutes to hours
(c) High: after the detection, the damage caused by
the attack can be fixed in a timescale of hours to
days
Based on these criteria, possible attacks in different
scenarios are analysed in Section 4. It should also be noticed
that this paper aims to discuss the possible cyber security
attacks to a full CAV (Level 5), where all the possible attacks
could be conducted via wireless communication remotely.
(e physical access of attacks is not considered when
evaluating the severity. (ese criteria may not be compre-
hensive and exclusive, however could be further refined and
extended. (is research presents the initial attempt to define
and rank the severity of possible attacks in CAV scenarios.
(is also aims to encourage further research developments
to raise public and CAV practitioners’ awareness towards
CAV cyber security.
4. Possible Attacks
In this section, possible attacks of CAVs are listed and
categorized, as shown in Table 4. Following the criteria
defined in Section 3, severity of each attack will be analysed.
CAV developments concern mainly two streams of research,
which are connectivity and automation, covering in-vehicle
and intervehicle components. Detailed potential attacks will
be analysed within these two streams.
Different autonomous levels may be exposed to different
attacks of different possibilities. (is paper focuses on the
attacks to a fully automated vehicle (i.e., level 5) according to
the SAE automation level [20]. Level 5 CAV is capable of all
the DDT under all circumstances. It is also assumed that all
the vehicles on the road are CAVs. In real-world situations,
there will be a mix of CAVs of different automation and
traditional vehicles for a certain period of time. In addition,
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it is known that CAVs will keep evolving and adapting more
technologies. (is paper only discusses attacks with existing
CAV technologies. However, as the attacks are categorized
on automation and connectivity in-vehicle and intervehicle,
the list of possible attacks could be extended if new tech-
nologies are adapted to CAVs.
4.1. Automation in CAVs. In the current CAV development,
all the vehicles from different companies have installed
multiple sensors. (e mainstream sensors include LiDAR,
Radar, and camera [43, 44]. For example, Google Waymo
vehicles are installed with a 360 degree camera on the roof as
the vision system and several LiDAR sensors and Radar
sensors around the vehicle body [45]. (ere are also sup-
plemental sensors such as the sound detection sensors.
(e possible attack target assets are analysed as below.
(1) Audio/entertainment devices: audio devices have
already been widely used in modern automobiles. It
evolved to a colorful touchable screen showing more
information in vehicles [46]. In CAVs, the audio/
video system could be used to warn users about
anomaly or abnormal behaviours detected in the
system or surrounding environments.
(a) Loud volume: the first possible attack is to
suddenly increase the volume of the voice such as
background music on board. (is attack could
distract the passengers’ attention or even cause
panic in certain situations. (e severity of in-
formation of leakage is low but the severity of
physical damage is medium, which means that
the overall severity is low.
(b) Fake sound: the attacker could use the audio
system to make fake noise such as a crash sound.
(is attack might cause passengers’ panic as well,
although is not likely to cause information
leakage.
(c) Remote control: this attack already happened in
real world. Two white hackers in the USA hacked
into a Jeep Great Cherokee from 10miles away and
then stopped the vehicle on a highway road
through the entertainment system [47]. (is is
because the vehicle CAN and the entertainment
system are combined together. If an attacker could
control the vehicle remotely through the audio/
entertainment system, the severity of physical
damage could be high. In addition, the risk of
information leakage will also be severe because the
attackers could send remote instructions to gather
private information. Moreover, in CAVs, the re-
mote-control attacks might happen on other
components leading to severe risks.
(2) Cameras: cameras provide the vision data, an in-
dispensable part in CAV. To detect the surrounding
objects and position the vehicle, camera is a fun-
damental sensor on CAVs. However, the camera’s
function could be replaced by other sensors when
they break down; thus, camera is of medium im-
portance. (ere are already successful attacks to
cameras to fool vehicles already [48].
(a) Blind vision: blind vision attack could be easily
achieved by physical access. However, with the
connectivity of the vehicle, it is even easier for
the attackers. (e attackers could disable the
camera by controlling a strong light resource
remotely. (e attack would not leak the private
information of the vehicle. However, this attack
would not cause fatal injuries as well because it
is easy to be detected, and CAV contains
multisensors’ data. If the cameras break down,
other sensors could still help to ‘see’ the envi-
ronment. Based on this, the overall severity level
of the attack is low.
(b) Mislead camera (fake images): by controlling the
cameras remotely, the attackers could inject fake
image information to mislead the cameras. (is
attack is more dangerous than the blind vision
attack because the detection possibility is lower.
For blind vision attack, the system or the user
could easily detect the abnormal situation. While
in the mislead camera attack, it may take longer
time to detect. In addition, the system might
make decisions based on the fake images, the
severity of physical attack is thus higher, and the
overall severity is high.
(3) Battery system: currently, the number of electric
vehicles on road is increasing. As an environment-
friendly transportation method, it is believed that the
future CAVs would be electric vehicles. (e vehicles’
battery system would also then be an attack target.
(e most possible attack to the battery system is the
DoS (Denial of Services) attack. In computer science, the
aim of DoS attack is to exhaust all the resources of the
target to make the computer, server, or communication
channel unavailable. In CAVs, the DoS attack could target
the energy sources to exhaust the power sources including
heating the seats on the vehicle. DoS attacks could be
really dangerous to the battery system. It could trigger
different parts to consume battery power in a short time.
Sudden battery loss could cause damage to the basic
functions of the vehicle. (e severity of physical damage is
medium, and the combined severity level is medium as
well.
Table 3: Combined severity level matrix (adapted from [35]).
Information leakage/physical damage Low Medium High
Low Low Low High
Medium Low Medium High
High Medium High High
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(4) LiDAR (light detection and ranging): LiDAR is the
most fundamental sensor in CAVs to support lo-
calization and parking assistance [49]. It uses light
point cloud to detect the distance and boundaries of
surrounding obstacles and environments [50]. (e
importance of LiDAR is medium. (ere are suc-
cessful attempts to attack the LiDAR by using strong
lights in a simulation environment [48].
(a) Jamming: this attack jams the LiDAR by using
strong lights to reflect the origin light. (e at-
tackers could not gather any information
through this attack. However, it may lead to
physical damage because the detection perfor-
mance of LiDAR will decrease.
(b) Hidden objects: because LiDAR uses the re-
flection of light to detect the surrounding en-
vironments, the attackers may use special
materials to absorb the light to avoid detection.
(is attack would not cause any information
leakage directly. However, in some situations, for
example, if the object is covered by special re-
flection materials, the vehicle would not observe
it. (is could cause physical damage or even fatal
injuries to the target vehicle. (e combined se-
verity of this attack is high as it may lead to fatal
accident.
(c) Fake objects: the attackers could use light re-
flection to simulate a fake object, e.g., a barrier in
front of the vehicle. (e target vehicles would
stop or change direction based on the false de-
tection. If multiple vehicles detect this fake ob-
ject, it could cause severe traffic congestion.
Moreover, if there are multiple fake objects on
the roads, this attack could cause physical
damage when CAVs try to avoid those fake
objects. With the other detection methods on the
vehicle, however, the possibility of fatal injuries
of this attack exists but is low. (e severity of
physical damage is medium and the combined
severity is medium as well.
(5) Radar: unlike LiDAR in CAVs, radar uses radio
waves instead of light to detect the surroundings.
Currently, there are two types of Radar on CAVs,
millimeter Radar [51], and Ultrasonic Radar [52].
(emillimeter radar is used on object detection [53],
and the ultrasonic radar is used in short distance
scenarios such as parking assistance system [54].(is
is because the speed of ultrasonic radar is slow, which
would lead to poor detection rate in high speed
movements. Radar is also of medium importance.
(a) Jamming: this attack is similar to the LiDAR
jamming attack. In radar jamming attack, the
attackers would use noise to degrade the signal of
radar. (e attacked radar system might not work
properly and the vehicle could not detect the
surrounding environments. If the noise source
influences multiple CAVs, the traffic flow would
be disturbed or it could even cause traffic col-
lisions. (is attack would not cause information
leakage directly but might cause physical dam-
age. (e combined severity of this attack is
medium.
(b) Hidden objects: currently, existing technologies
are able to hide objects from radar detection and
have been already adapted in the area of military
aerospace [55]. (e planes or the objects hide
themselves by changing the regular reflection
shape or using radar absorbing materials. In
military, the mitigation method is already de-
veloped, which is called Radar Antistealth
Technology [55]. (is technology will strengthen
the radar signal. (is attack would not cause
information leakage but might cause physical
damage, or even hurt people directly. (e
combined severity level of this attack is high.
(c) Fake objects: the attackers broadcast fake radar
signals to conduct the attack. Other vehicles
would then detect the false signal and take
corresponding reactions. (is attack would not
cause information leakage, however, might cause
physical damage to infrastructures, e.g., colli-
sions when vehicles are trying to avoid fake
objects. (e combined severity of this attack is
medium.
(6) GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System): the most
widely used GNSS system is GPS (Global Positioning
System) from the USA [56]. Currently, other
countries are developing their own GNSS such as
Beidou from China, Galileo from Europe Union, and
Glonass from Russia [57]. (e GNSS system could
help to locate and navigate the vehicle. Hacking into
this system requires high-level knowledge.(e GNSS
system is a major resource for positioning and
navigation, but as the positioning and navigation are
cooperated via V2V communication, the importance
of GNSS system is thus medium.
(a) Spoofing: GNSS spoofing attack sends similar
GNSS signals to mislead the receivers of the
target CAVs. (e attackers could use these de-
vices to lead the vehicle to false location or wrong
route. In 2013, researchers from the University of
Texas at Austin successfully fooled an 80 million
dollar super-yacht by their GPS spoofing devices
[58]. Compared to the GNSS jamming attack,
GNSS spoofing attack would be more dangerous.
Without the GNSS signals, CAVs would use
other methods such as V2V communication or
SLAM (Simultaneous Localization and Map-
ping) to navigate and avoid the possible hazards
such as collisions. However, if the information is
wrong and not detected, CAVs would trust the
wrong GNSS information and take wrong re-
actions, which may lead to collisions and fatal
injuries. In addition, a vehicle that has been
spoofed successfully could respond with private
10 Journal of Advanced Transportation
information such as the location information
and historic route information to the attackers,
which would also cause information leakage. In
that case, the severity of information leakage is
medium and the severity of physical damage is
high.
(b) Jamming: in the GNSS jamming attack, the at-
tackers will send stronger power signal to the
CAV receiver. (e GNSS signal is normally weak
when they approach the receivers, and it could be
easily covered by the jamming signal. (e real
GNSS signal will then be ignored. In addition, it is
also difficult to detect the jamming attack because
the GNSS signal is likely to decrease due to in-
terference or limited number of satellites [59].
CAVs could not navigate and locate without the
GNSS signal. However, V2V communication
could help to navigate coordinately as a backup
method. (e severity levels of both information
leakage and physical damage are medium.
(7) In-vehicle system: in-vehicle system contains the
microcontrollers and communication instructions in
the vehicle sent by CAN (Controller Area Network)
or other communication methods such as WiFi and
Bluetooth. (e in-vehicle system is related to all the
operational functions, thus is of high importance.
(a) Injection: the attackers would inject nonexisting
information or even malware to the system
through ports such as USB ports. With the fake
information, CAVs might make wrong decisions
leading to physical damage. As an active attack,
injection could also cause leakage of sensitive data.
(e combined severity of this attack is medium.
(b) Eavesdropping: eavesdropping is a passive attack
and is difficult to be noticed. (e main objective
of this attack is not to cause physical damage but
to gain access to valuable data. (us, the severity
of information leakage is high and the severity of
physical damage is low.
(c) Traffic analysis: traffic analysis is also a passive
attack. (e attackers will monitor and observe
the data and then try to identify the pattern in the
data flow. As a passive attack, the traffic analysis
attack would not cause physical damage directly
and the scale of information leakage is limited.
(e combined severity of this attack is low.
(d) Modification: this attack modifies the messages
sent between different components and units.
(e wrong messages could lead to the wrong
decision and action of the vehicle. (e severity of
this attack is medium.
4.2. Connectivity in CAVs. (ere are three main types of
vehicle communication in CAV network. V2V (Vehicle-to-
Vehicle) communication is between vehicles via wireless
network. V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communication is
between vehicles and infrastructures via wireless network
and V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) includes V2V, V2I, and
communications between vehicles and other entities such as
cloud database or pedestrians [60]. Compared with tradi-
tional automobiles, these communication methods could
help to improve the accuracy of location in rural area and
prevent accidents efficiently. Meanwhile, some computer
cyber attacks might also happen in CAV environment. For
example, in a network cyber attack benchmark KDD99 [61],
cyber attacks such as DoS attack could be adapted into V2V
communication. Nowadays, many communication tech-
nologies are being used in CAV network, e.g., DSRC
(Dedicated Short Range Communication), LTE (Local
(ermal Equilibrium), and 5G [62].
(e possible attack target assets of connectivity are
analysed as below.
(8) V2V Communication (with other vehicles): V2V
communication is a crucial part in future CAVs.
However, there are no general adapted communi-
cation standards for V2V communication. Cur-
rently, the V2V communication standard in the
USA is DSRC, which is based on IEEE 802.11p
standard [63]. In Europe, there is ITS-G5 for V2V
communication [64]. V2V communication could
help to navigate or warn vehicles of potential
hazards.
(a) DoS: in addition to the battery system, DoS
attack could also happen in the V2V commu-
nication.(e attackers could send huge amount
of data to block the communication channel of
the target vehicle from receiving external in-
formation. (is attack would not cause infor-
mation leakage but might cause physical
damage especially in the rural area, where the
V2V communication is the main data source for
vehicle planning.
(b) Modification on message/fake message: the
communication between vehicles would send
different types of information including posi-
tion coordinates, speed, and head angle. If the
attackers send fake messages, the target vehicle
would take wrong reactions. In addition, if the
target vehicle trusts the fake message, it may
respond to the attacker with private informa-
tion. Based on this, the overall severity is
medium.
(c) Hidden vehicle: this attack is also a type of
passive attack. (e attackers would disable their
ownmessage sender to hide their activities. (is
would not cause information leakage directly,
but might cause physical damage if the vehicle
hide its activities and approach the target ve-
hicle silently.
(9) V2I communication (with infrastructure): nowa-
days, there are some initial uses of V2I commu-
nication. For example, the ETC (Electronic Toll
Collection) on roads and bridges use RFID (Radio
Frequency Identification) to charge vehicles [65].
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Apart from the communication channel, which is
similar to the V2V communication, there are other
attack types in V2I communication.
(a) Change infrastructure sign: the infrastructure
signs in transportation help vehicles to navigate,
locate, or control speed. CAVs could ‘read’ the
sign and take corresponding actions. If the
attackers change infrastructure signs such as the
road direction sign, it will lead the vehicle to
wrong route. In addition, if multiple traffic
lights are changed intentionally, it could cause
severe traffic congestion or even traffic
collisions.
(b) Block/remove sign: the infrastructure signs
could also be blocked or removed physically or
remotely. If an emergency alert sign is removed
intentionally, this could cause traffic congestion
and accidents. However, this attack will not
cause information leakage. (e combined se-
verity of this attack is medium.
(10) V2X communication (mainly on cloud).
(a) Cloud ID dataset: authority is important in
CAV network. Each CAV would be assigned a
unique ID such as an electronic plate. In order
to confirm the reliability of the communica-
tion, only the information from the trusted
CAVs in the dataset could be accepted. All the
communication and information exchange
are based on the authority from the CAV
cloud.
(b) Cloud real-time traffic database: cloud database
collects the traffic data to provide transportation
guidance. It includes the real-time traffic con-
gestion data and accident data to inform all the
CAVs to avoid certain areas. If the attackers
inject fake messages or modify messages, all the
vehicles in the cloud database would receive
wrong information. In addition, the attackers
could also access valuable information in the
dataset.
With the severity criteria, all the attacks are then grouped
into four categories, as shown in Table 5. It can be seen that
the critical attacks contain remote control, fake vision on
cameras, hidden objects to LiDAR and Radar, spoofing
attack to GNSS, and fake identity in cloud authority. It could
be summarized that all the critical attacks are related to
spoofing and falsify messages. (ese attacks are difficult to
realize and they could all lead to wrong reaction or even fatal
injuries.
5. Mitigation Methods
For each of the attacks analysed in Section 4, the mitigation
methods will be different. By adapting the mitigation
methods in information security [35], the main types of
mitigation methods could be grouped into five categories. To
CAVs, the mitigation methods could be similar but need to
be considered based on specific CAV characteristics.
(1) Prevention: these methods prevent the attack
from influencing the whole vehicle system neg-
atively. In potential attacks to CAVs, the pre-
vention is for passive attacks such as
eavesdropping by encrypting the communication
channel and messages. In addition, all the CAV
users could be authorized with the credibility of
the messages. For example, to the eavesdropping
attacks in in-vehicle system, if the communica-
tion channel and messages are encrypted, it is
much more difficult for attackers to make use of
the information.
(2) Reduction: reduction methods reduce the possibility
or feasibility of the attack. It could also reduce the
possible impacts of the attacks to a controllable level.
In CAVs, the reduction methods include the re-
dundant sensors. If one sensor breaks down, the
vehicle could still rely on the data from other sensors
to reduce the impact of each sensor. For example, to
reduce the impact of the blind vision attack to the
camera, the vehicle could use other sensors after
detecting abnormal attacks.
(3) Transference: transference shares the possible
risks with others, such as a reliable third-party
organization including governments and insur-
ance companies. For example, in the Cloud of
V2X communication, the authority of each CAV’s
identity should be assigned by the government or
relevant legitimate organizations. All the CAVs
information should also be stored safely and
monitored by the trusted third-party. Not all the
Table 5: Categories of severity of attacks.
Level Description Attack types
1 Critical Remote control (audio/video devices); mislead cameras/fake vision (cameras); hidden objects (LiDAR); hidden objects(radar); spoofing (GNSS); fake identity (cloud authority)
2 Important
Fake objects (LiDAR); fake objects (radar); DoS attack (battery system); injection (in-vehicle system); modification
(in-vehicle system); modification (V2V communication); fake/ghost message (V2V communication); change
infrastructure sign (V2I communication); injection (cloud dataset); modification (cloud dataset)
3 Moderate
Blind vision (cameras); jamming (LiDAR); jamming (radar); jamming (GNSS); eavesdropping (in-vehicle system);
traffic analysis (in-vehicle system); DoS attack (V2V communication); block/remove sign (infrastructure sign); road
line changing (road)
4 Minor Loud volume (audio/video devices); fake sound (audio/video devices)
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attacks could be resolved by transference. In
CAVs, this mitigation method could only be used
when a single vehicle manufacturer or a supplier
could not handle all the information safely.
(4) Acceptance: acceptance is to retain the risks caused
by those attacks with limited negative impacts on
CAVs. (e attack might not have a proper coun-
termeasure and the impact is at an acceptable level.
For example, to the traffic analysis attack in in-
vehicle communication, the leaked information
could only be the size and timing of the commu-
nication package, which is not likely to cause
physical damage. In addition, the traffic analysis
attack, which is a passive attack, could not be
prevented by message and communication channel
encryption. In that case, the traffic analysis attack
could be tolerated.
(5) Contingency: contingency considers the possible
reactions if the attacks happen. A contingency plan
needs to be prepared to recover the system once
attacked. If the CAV system detects an abnormal
battery loss due to the DoS attack, it could pull up the
CAV to a safe place.
6. Conclusion
CAV is a fundamental part of intelligent transportation
systems and has started attracting increasing research at-
tention in the last few years. Given the importance of CAVs
in relation to personal information, physical damages, and
passengers’ lives, cyber security of CAVs are thus becoming
highly important in research developments.
(is paper has identified some of the most important
cyber attacks to CAVs. For each identified cyber attack, the
target asset, the possible risks, and the consequences have
been analysed. (e severity level of information leakage and
physical damage are then estimated and considered based on
a new criteria adapted from engineering and software de-
velopments. Possible mitigation methods are then catego-
rized and suggested to resolve these attacks.
Among the attacks identified in this paper, the spoofing
and falsify messages attacks including remote control, fake
vision on cameras, hidden objects to LiDAR and Radar,
spoofing attack to GNSS, and fake identity in cloud authority
have been identified as the most dangerous attacks to CAVs.
All of these attacks would cause severe consequences to
information leakage and physical damage.
However, it should also be noticed that CAV technol-
ogies are fast evolving. (is paper discusses the potential
cyber attacks in the existing CAVs technologies and derives
the potential attacks based on the traditional cyber attacks.
Within the scope of CAV hardware, software, and data, the
possible attacks listed in Table 4 will be further extended to
reflect the latest developments in CAVs. Meanwhile, the
overall severity of each attack is only judged by the listed
criteria. It could be further discussed based on other criteria.
Due to the emerging infrastructures under construction at
different countries, and the unique characteristics of real-
world environments required, there is a lack of readily
complete testing environments compliant to generally
adopted standards available in research and practice. Apart
from defining and categorizing the potential cyber attacks, it
should also be stressed that the evaluations of the severity of
each type of attacks also need to be defined and justified
carefully based on real-world field tests. Furthermore, the
severity assessment of the listed potential attacks only
considers single sensor. For example, in real-world tests, if
the cameras fail to recognize an obstacle on the road, the
LiDAR and Radar might complement and help to recognize
and avoid the obstacle. In some extreme situations, all the
sensors or backup elements/functions might be ineffective or
fail. (e assessment of the severity for different attacks
should consider and evaluated the integration of multiple
sensors and would also be an interesting topic for future
research. In addition, the advantage, disadvantage, and
application scenarios of each mitigation method are not the
focus in this paper.(e presentedmitigationmethods will be
extended and refined further in future research on CAVs
cyber security.
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